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SPEECH
FROM EXPERTISE TO POLITICS: THE
TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN RULEMAKING
Peter L. Strauss*
In this speech to be given on November 15, 1996, as the American
contribution to the week-long conference on administrative law spon-
sored by the Fundaci6n Estudios de Derecho Administrativo in Ca-
racas, Venezuela, Professor Peter L. Strauss addresses the history and
developing political character of rulemaking in federal law over the
fifty years since enactment of the Administrative Procedure Act. As a
framework, Professor Strauss sets forth a hierarchy of institutional
rulemaking, from constitution through informal advising. He then de-
velops his discussion of rulemaking by tracing the federal process of
rulemaking through time, beginning with the enactment of the Admin-
istrative Procedure Act of 1946 and the formative years of its applica-
tion. He then turns to the active rulemaking era that began with the
administration of John F. Kennedy and ran through the Nixon-Ford
administrations. Next, Professor Strauss relates the process of
rulemaking during the era of "running against big government" that
began with the Carter administration and ran through the Reagan
and Bush years. Finally, Professor Strauss considers the present state
of rulemaking. He argues that, appropriately, the political character
of rulemaking has been receiving increasing attention. For a variety of
reasons, today's rulemaking concerns are increasingly with the period
before a formal notice of proposed rulemaking has occurred. Regretta-
bly, the developments he chronicles have not been accompanied by
concern for their overall effect on the fairness, accuracy, efficiency,
and democratic characteristics of what has been a highly useful proce-
dural device. He sees as the result a fairly profound disincentive to
use rulemaking, and calls upon Congress and the courts for more care-
ful assessment of the need for and impact of various elements of their
approaches.
Probably every society has a discernible hierarchy of legislative
forms, varying in their generality and political grounding. In the United
States, as elsewhere, this hierarchy has both a geographic and an institu-
tional expression.
* Betts Professor of Law, Columbia Law School. The author would like to thank John
Manning, Todd Rakoff, Roy Schotland, and Sidney Shapiro for their very helpful comments
on earlier drafts.
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Geographically, one may distinguish among legislative forms that are
national, statewide, or local in their application. The tendency, certainly
problematic in some cases and complicated by American ideas of federal-
ism, is for the largest social issues to be dealt with at the national level,
those where greater variety of outcome may be sustained at the state
level, and the least important (or at least most variable) issues at the
local level. National legislation, where it exists, dominates state legisla-
tion; and state legislation, where it exists, dominates local. Probably a
similar geographic hierarchy exists, with or without the complications of
federalism, in any complex society.
Institutionally, at each of the geographic levels, one can also describe
a hierarchy that I suspect must be quite general in complex political soci-
eties. At the apex, one places the constitutional document-the charter,
in the case of municipalities; then ordinary legislation produced by a rep-
resentative legislature; then "regulations" adopted by governmental or-
gans other than the legislature-"subordinate legislation," as it is often
called; and, even less formally, declarations of policy or interpretation, or
documents offering guidance for compliance with the foregoing. It may be
useful to outline the general legal and political characteristics of this hier-
archy, as an introduction to our specific discussion of rulemaking.
Constitutional documents are brief in comparison to the general mass
of legislative activity, extremely general in their pronouncements, and-of
particular importance here-adopted by special procedures that suggest
both relative permanence and the highest degree of political legitimacy.1
In the United States, this entails ratification by super-majorities, both
nationally and at the state level, and a declared source (not quite born
out by the elaborate and demanding ratification procedures) directly in
"We the People." We imagine our Constitution, not as an act adopted by
authorized agents, but as a direct expression of popular will. In the states,
typically, constitutional amendments must be ratified by popular vote.
For municipal charters, the situation is somewhat more complex, but the
same characteristics of relative brevity, generality and permanence, and
of special procedures for adoption, prevail. Once adoption has occurred,
that fact establishes the legitimacy of the prescription, unless a superior
form of law is inconsistent-thus, federal law could control the validity of
a provision of the Constitution of New York State, but within New York's
own law, the adoption of a constitutional provision is in itself sufficient to
establish its validity.
One function of the constitutional documents is to establish legisla-
tive bodies empowered to adopt ordinary legislation and to define the
spheres within which they are authorized to do so. Typically the bodies
1. If parliamentary democracies, such as England's, do not invariably recognize a for-
mal, special constitutional form of enactment, the behavior of those democracies is nonethe-
less as if such principles existed; whatever its technical authority (for example, to alter the
legislation determining the frequency of Parliamentary elections or the status of the Monar-
chy), the English Parliament behaves as if these would be extremely special matters, action
on which would require extraordinary attention to the public will.
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thus authorized are composed of officials elected for that purpose, agents
of the people who periodically must have their agency renewed through
the political process. National and state legislatures, and local councils,
are composed of persons elected from geographical subunits of the legis-
lating jurisdiction for the responsibility of adopting ordinary legislation.
These are generalist institutions, and their work product is typically both
transitive and intransitive in character. 2 That is, in some instances-as in
enacting a criminal statute or a commercial code-their legislation di-
rectly resolves the substantive issues that give rise to the need to legis-
late; in others, the legislature instead creates a loose framework of policy
and establishes expert bodies (agencies) to deal with issues that may ap-
pear too unpredictable, complex or specialized for direct legislative reso-
lution. While it is sometimes argued that the subdelegation of authority
to fix rules of conduct is illegitimate,3 the practice is universal in America,
as I suspect it is in most if not all complex societies. A legislature can
more easily decide the relative importance of safety in the workplace to
other issues, and direct an agency to assure that it be achieved, than
specify the elements of safe practice for each industrial situation in a con-
stantly changing economy. One may fairly raise questions in particular
cases whether legislators have acted as fully as they might to define the
field within which subordinate legislation will be adopted by a given
agency, or what parameters they have set for the political and legal re-
sponsibility of the agencies they have thus empowered; but the phenome-
non of subdelegation is an inevitable by-product of a complex society and
the limits of time and resources available to a generalist legislature.
While constitutional provisions are validated by the fact of their
adoption, the practice of reviewing legislation for constitutionality reflects
the existence of judicial controls over the validity of formally proper legis-
lation. Although courts do not inquire into the procedural adequacy of
legislative actions that satisfy the few specified constitutional formalities,
the vote of the legislature does not inevitably establish a statute's formal
adequacy. Rather, any statute is subject to judicial inquiry into its consis-
tency with constitutional empowerments and prescriptions. Issues of sub-
stantive authorization, in this respect, are not seriously inquired into; a
2. Edward L. Rubin, Law and Legislation in the Administrative State, 89 COLU. L.
REv. 369, 380 (1989).
3. In American jurisprudence, the classic theoretical statement of this position, often
evoked but never enforced, is the following passage from JOHN LoCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF
GovEn Nmr § 141 (C.B. Macpherson ed., Hackett Publishing Co. 1980) (1690):
The people alone can appoint the form of the common-wealth, which is by con-
stituting the legislative, and appointing in whose hands that shall be. And when
the people have said, We will submit to rules, and be governed by laws made by
such men, and in such forms, nobody else can say other men shall make laws for
them; nor can the people be bound by any laws but, such as are enacted by
those whom they have chosen, and authorized to make laws for them. The power
of the legislative, being derived from the people by a positive voluntary grant
and institution, can be no other than what that positive grant conveyed, which
being only to make laws, and not make legislators, the legislative can have no
power to transfer their authority of making laws, and place it in other hands.
1996]
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court will sustain a legislative judgment that a given statute is within the
substantive authority of the legislature to enact, unless persuaded that no
state of social fact could support that judgment. Assertions that statutes
conflict with constitutional guaranties of individual liberties, however,
will generally produce a more intense inquiry into the justification for the
statute and the seriousness of its impact upon the claimed rights.
At the third level, beneath constitutions and legislation, is the prac-
tice of adopting regulations. We can describe this rulemaking in idealized
terms as the more-or-less expert filling in of details in the specification of
rules for private conduct, for which the legislative process is poorly suited
or has insufficient time. A given jurisdiction will have many rulemakers,
and only one legislature. If that one legislature can annually produce a
book's worth of politically ratified work, all the jurisdiction's rulemakers
taken together are capable of generating several library shelves worth of
rules. These regulations have the force and effect of statutes (although as
we shall see their legitimacy is differently established). A construction
company must obey the rules of the Occupational Safety and Health Ad-
ministration (OSHA) respecting the storage of potentially explosive
gases4 or the safety measures required for persons working on exposed
surfaces, 5 at the risk of fines or other sanctions for having failed to do so.
Thus, rules may be subordinate legislation, but are unmistakably legisla-
tive in their impact.
External oversight of rulemaking is much more extensive and de-
manding than external oversight of statutes. Valid adoption of a rule re-
quires compliance with statutorily prescribed procedures for rulemaking,
action within the extent of statutory authority delegated to the agency,
and a judgment supported by the materials generated in the course of the
rulemaking. In contrast with statutes, each of these issues is subject to
fairly close examination on judicial review-a substitute, as one might
characterize it, for the political legitimacy characterizing the adoption of
constitutional and statutory prescriptions. In addition, as might be
imagined, a variety of devices for political oversight of rulemaking are
available to both the President and the Congress-the elected actors of
American government-and to the corresponding actors at the state and
local levels. The body of this essay is an examination of these matters,
and the way in which they have been changing over past decades-in re-
sponse, one may believe, to concerns about the legitimacy of this impor-
tant lawmaking activity.
Before turning to these matters in detail, however, it is appropriate
to mention a fourth level of legislative activity-more guidance than pre-
scription-that also occurs, less formally, at the agency level. Agency
rules themselves require interpretation and open a variety of issues. A
rule of the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) may specify the pa-
rameters that an aircraft component must meet to establish its safety, but
4. 29 C.F.R. § 1910.109 (1995).
5. Id. § 1926.403.
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not precisely show how this can be accomplished. Once again, time and
resources do not permit the resolution of all questions through the
rulemaking just briefly described; other issues seem better left to private
initiative than encased in the hard matrix of actual prescription. Indeed,
current American politics tends to favor rules that set performance stan-
dards-that is, rules that tell the subjects of regulation what they have to
accomplish, leaving the precise means of doing so to their initiative-over
rules that command the use of particular designs. If the costs of making
and qualifying one's own design are moderate, the result is to promote
efficiency and innovation. For some enterprises, however, perhaps espe-
cially smaller enterprises, the costs and uncertainties of design may be
quite substantial in relation to these possible gains. To meet these needs,
in addition to legislative rulemaking, agencies-or more properly their
professional staffs-may engage in a much less formal process of offering
guidance as to meaning and possible means of compliance. Thus, supple-
menting the FAA's rule setting the performance standards a certain air-
craft component must meet, its staff may provide a quite technical
document outlining one or more concrete ways in which it has already
concluded the safety of the component can be assured. This practice
leaves other possibilities open, but also can reduce compliance costs for
those attracted to what already has won probable staff approval. Those
subject to regulation often solicit this advice-giving activity eagerly, as an
efficient means of resolving uncertainties that could be quite costly to
them. The resulting interpretive and policy documents are not formally
binding; their adoption is extremely informal, usually not penetrating the
upper echelons of the responsible agency; and-continuing the pyramidal
metaphor already suggested-their volume, in the agencies that employ
them, dwarfs that of regulations in about the same proportion as regula-
tions dwarf statutes.6 They serve the invaluable functions of revealing
agency thinking on controversial questions, and pointing toward what
might not otherwise be obvious paths of compliance.
Precisely because these instruments are not legally binding and pro-
cedures for their adoption are not specified, questions of their legitimacy
are subdued, and judicial review is infrequent. Courts are occasionally
persuaded that an agency has used ostensible "guidance" to evade the
procedural and other obligations of legislative rulemaking-that an
agency has acted towards those it regulates as if its interpretation or pol-
icy were formally binding "law." 7 In some cases, too, the announcement
6. In 1992, I reported that formally adopted tax regulations take about 30 centimeters
of shelf space; revenue rulings and similar advisory documents, seven meters; the rule of the
Federal Aviation Administration, five centimeters; but the corresponding technical guidance
material, in excess of six meters. Peter L. Strauss, The Rulemaking Continuum, 41 DuKE
L.J. 1463, 1468-69 (1992).
7. See Community Nutrition Inst. v. Young, 818 F.2d 943, 950 (D.C. Cir. 1987); Pacific
Gas & Elec. Co. v. Federal Power Comm'n, 506 F.2d 33, 45 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Robert A.
Anthony, Interpretive Rules, Policy Statements, Guidances, Manuals, and the
Like-Should Federal Agencies Use Them to Bind the Public?, 41 DuKE L.J. 1311, 1359-60
(1992); Strauss, supra note 6, at 1467.
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of an interpretation will have such consequences for the private commu-
nity that the courts can be persuaded to consider whether it is valid. In
general, however, the interpretation or policy will not become a subject of
inquiry until it has actually been applied in a particular case.
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binding guidance binding guidance binding guidance
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The preceding may be sufficient to suggest that questions of legal
and political legitimacy about rulemaking are both important and unset-
tled in American jurisprudence. What seemed to me possibly interesting
for this occasion would be to look at the answers we have been developing
over time-a course of development that one may well believe has over-
shot the mark, but also one that unmistakably reflects the importance of
this device for the development of law, and the felt necessity of finding
political as well as legal warrant for it. I will tell this story at the federal
level, where it is both the most complex and the most familiar. Yet I am
confident similar trends could be found at all political levels of rulemak-
ing activity.
A. 1946-61
Nineteen forty-six is the year in which, with enactment of the federal
Administrative Procedure Act (APA),8 the United States first adopted
8. Administrative Procedure Act, ch. 324, 60 Stat. 237 (1946). The APA was recodi-
Super-majorities, Very occasional Established by adoption, unless inconsistent with
"We the People" higher constitution
Vote of elected Dozens yearly Highly pernissivejudicial review of substance
representatives, with only for constitutionality only; usually sustained
concurrence (or over unless individual rights Implicated
opposition) of chief
executive
Formal action of Across government many Political oversight judicialy reviewed for
agency with statutory hundreds yearly procedural compliance, legal (constitutional and
authority to adopt statutory) authority, support In record, etc.
Agency saff, as IWithin agency, several times Not legally binding; courts may sometimes review
specifiedby agency rulemating volume for correctness of interpretation
pressures I_____________ I_______________I______
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general statutory procedures for rulemaking at the national level. The
noted scholar Kenneth Culp Davis called this possibly the most impor-
tant aspect of that Act;9 he is often quoted and never contradicted in this
regard.10 While 1946 marked the beginning of specified procedures for
rulemaking, however, government agencies had long been adopting rules;
and the courts, when confronted with the evidence of this subordinate
lawmaking, had in general found it unremarkable. In 1911, for example,
the United States Supreme Court had no difficulty upholding the fine
imposed on a rancher for grazing sheep in a national forest without a
permit, in violation of a regulation the Secretary of Agriculture had
adopted under quite general authority "to make provision for the protec-
tion against . .. depredations upon the public forests."'" This statute
made no specific mention of livestock or grazing permits, but did provide
the penalties for violating any regulations the Secretary might adopt.12
The unanimous Court characterized the Secretary's permit-requiring rule,
without which there would have been no offense, as not legislating, but
only exercising, a "power to fill up the details."" Congress had legislated
sufficiently when it permitted the making of regulations for a specified
public purpose and set the penalties that could be assessed on their viola-
tion. 4 In 1935, reviewing a state agency's rule defining the kinds of con-
tainers that could be used to package fresh raspberries and strawberries,
the Court found the fact that this legal requirement had resulted from an
agency, and not the state legislature, was irrelevant to its reviewing func-
tion.' 5 Again unanimously, it rejected the idea that an agency exercising
delegated authority was subject to procedural requirements (in this case,
the making of findings) greater than would be imposed on a legislature. 6
Where the regulation is within the scope of authority legally delegated,
the presumption of the existence of facts justifying its specific exercise
attaches alike to statutes .. .and to orders of administrative bodies.
... [T]he statute did not require special findings; doubtless because
the regulation authorized was general legislation, not an administrative
order in the nature of a judgment directed against an individual
concern.3
fled as part of a general revision of Title 5; its provisions are now incorporated into 5 U.S.C.
§§ 551-559, 701-706 (1994).
9. See 1 KENNETH CuLP DAvIs, ADmNISTmATIV LAW TREATISE § 6.15, at 283 (1st ed.
Supp. 1970) (calling informal rulemaking "one of the greatest inventions of modern
government").
10. E.g., William Funk, Rationality Review of State Administrative Rulemaking, 43
ADmw. L Rzv. 147, 164 (1991); Thomas 0. McGarity, Some Thoughts on "Deossifying" the
Rulemaking Process, 41 DuKE L.J. 1385, 1385 (1992).
11. United States v. Grimaud, 220 U.S. 506, 509 (1911).
12. Id. at 509.
13. Id. at 516.
14. Id. at 517.
15. Pacific States Box & Basket Co. v. White, 296 U.S. 176, 185-86 (1935).
16. Id. at 186.
17. Id.
19961
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The 1946 APA's informal rulemaking procedures applied only to leg-
islative rulemaking,18 the third category in the hierarchy of legislative ac-
tivity set out above. Policy and interpretive guidance instruments,
although understandably defined as "rules," 19 were exempted from any
procedural requirements beyond simple publication.20 In relation to the
prior law, the new APA procedures for legislative rulemaking, although
apparently undemanding and so intended at the time, enlarged both
agency responsibilities2 ' and the possibilities of judicial control.2 2 There
were now general procedures for rulemaking,23 compliance with which
could be enforced;24 a mild requirement of findings to accompany
rulemaking,25 quite unlike statutes; and, indeed, the APA defined the
tasks of courts reviewing agency actions, including rulemaking, quite dif-
ferently from what courts would expect to do when considering the con-
stitutionality of statutes.26 Since these procedures set the baseline for our
analysis, it will be useful to state them explicitly.
The APA established three basic procedural requirements for infor-
mal rulemaking: first, the publication of general public notice of proposed
rulemaking; second, an opportunity for any concerned individual to file
written commentary about the proposal with the proposing agency; and,
finally, a concise, general explanation by the agency of its basis for adopt-
ing of a rule.2 7 In addition, the subtitle of the APA providing generally for
judicial review of agency action established the eventual possibility of ju-
dicial review to determine the lawfulness of an act of rulemaking in at
least three respects: first, the agency's compliance with procedural re-
quirements; second, its legal authority to adopt the rule; and, finally, to
some extent, the factual support for and the rationality of the agency's
judgment.28
As late as 1958, when Kenneth Culp Davis published the first edition
of his famous treatise on Administrative Law,29 rulemaking was a some-
what undervalued procedure in practice, and the requirements for its ex-
ercise were quite permissively viewed. The requirement of notice, in
statutory terms, could be satisfied by inclusion of "either the terms or
substance of the proposed rule or a description of the subjects and issues
involved."30 The statute gave no indication of how long the agency must
provide for interested persons "to participate in the rule making through
18. Administrative Procedure Act, ch. 324, 60 Stat. 237 (1946).
19. Id. at 237.
20. Id. at 239.
21. Id. at 238.
22. Id. at 239-40.
23. Id. at 238-39.
24. Id. at 242-44.
25. Id. at 239.
26. Id. at 243-44.
27. Id. at 239.
28. Id. at 243-44.
29. KENNETH CULP DAVIS, ADMInSTRATVE LAW TREATISE (1958).
30. Administrative Procedure Act, ch. 324, 60 Stat. 237, 239 (1946) (emphasis added).
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submission of written data, views, or arguments,""1 and one or two
months was as long as any provided. The two provisions, taken together,
fairly suggested the parameters of a hearing on legislation, conducted by
a legislative committee: participants were volunteers whose contributions
might aid (or perhaps influence) the work product and were not parties
with rights of control over the evaluation process or the outcome. And the
statutory requirements for findings, that "the agency shall incorporate in
any rules adopted a concise general statement of their basis and pur-
pose,"3 2 were literally understood; a one or two page statement of the
agency's reasoning was understood to suffice to meet a findings require-
ment much less stringent than the APA stated for the results of formal
adjudication.
To the extent rules were subjected to judicial review, which does not
seem to have been often, its demands were not great. The formulation of
the notice provision in the alternative, and the specific invitation of the
findings requirement to brevity and generality were taken at face value.
Rules, like statutes, were rarely challenged "in the abstract," but rather
in connection with enforcement proceedings-and in that context issues
like procedural regularity in rulemaking, and record support for the
rulemaking judgment would naturally recede into the background. Nor at
this time did the political branches make concerted efforts to control or
participate in rulemaking. Rulemaking was an ordinary agency activity.
The dominant understanding was that agency action was "expert," in-
tended to operate at some remove from politics; and both Congress and
the White House tended not to get involved. Thus, while we can see some
movement in the APA to increase the responsibility and responsiveness of
agency rulemaking, it was at the outset a highly informal and "free"
activity.
31. Id.
32. Id. (emphasis added).
1996]






Notice of Proposed [ighlygeneral, phrased
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If major, unanticipated[
comments are filed Comment Period
Strictly internal
Agency consideration I andinsttutonal
Adpinof Ruleis [ enerstatentofbasis and generalpurpose"
Highly perissive
Post-adoption events judicalreview
It may be useful for any reader used to parliamentary systems to
pause here and note to herself some particular characteristics of Ameri-
can government that shape this presentation. Recall that, in our practice,
the President and Congress are radically separated. The heads of govern-
ment agencies are not responsible to the legislature in the parliamentary
sense; they may be called up for oversight hearings, but they are not per-
mitted to be members of Congress, and the only formal means available
to Congress to control their actions is through the enactment of legisla-
tion or, in very rare cases, impeachment. Even the President's controls
over their actions are somewhat indirect, particularly in the case of the
independent regulatory commissions. It is for this reason that the preced-
ing paragraphs, and those that follow, can be written from the perspective
that political controls over rulemaking are not inevitable. One's impres-
sion is that in parliamentary systems, the development of subsidiary leg-
islation (rules) is highly disciplined by the party controlling the
government, and is generally a strictly confidential, internal, bureaucratic
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process. In the United States, which lacks a political government in that
strong, coordinated sense, the development of rules is a public process on
which politics may operate as an external force, but which it does not
wholly determine. Indeed at times, as just noted, Americans have be-
haved as if rulemaking were an expert more than a political process.
While a mixture of the two has perhaps always been present, one result
has been to animate an expectation of rationality in rulemaking that few
would ever anticipate in legislation.
B. 1961-77
The period beginning with the election of John F. Kennedy and run-
ning through the Nixon-Ford administration marked a tremendous ex-
pansion in the ambition of American government and, in particular, in
the prominence, use, and development of rulemaking.33 Many of the new
governmental initiatives begun at the time-regulation of environmental,
health, and safety issues-not only pointed toward rulemaking as the
most sensible means for implementing the policy responsibilities that
were being assigned, but also entailed regulation that would have a
sweeping impact across the American economy. Where previously the
predominant national regulators tended to focus on particular concerns
(such as the securities industry or transportation sectors), the Environ-
mental Protection Agency (EPA) and OSHA were issuing rules affecting
all industries, in every state.
Scholars, in the meantime, were awakening to the advantages of in-
formal rulemaking over case by case adjudication (the usually available
alternative) for policy formation, and encouraging the broader use of this
underappreciated procedure. While the procedures of rulemaking were
less demanding than those of adjudication, they were also more demo-
cratic; rather than leave an important policy issue to the accident of who
happened to be the parties to a particular adjudication (and their law-
yers), all interested persons received notice of the issues at stake in
rulemaking and were entitled to participate on an equal footing. The re-
quirements of adjudication for objectivity and dispassion in decision
often constrained agencies to highly artificial allocation of decisional re-
sponsibilities and participation rights within themselves. In contrast, in-
formal rulemaking permitted the agency to bring all its resources to bear
on decision in an institutionally efficient and productive way. And the
public found it easier to know the applicable law in a system of
rules-definitive and easily located textual prescriptions-than in a sys-
tem of case law, where the governing rules emerged from the somewhat
obscure and temporally extended processes of common law development.
The democratic part of these arguments, we can now see, drew force
from a general social trend that came to view agencies less as apolitical
"experts" administering a strictly rational process, and more as political
33. See KENNETH CuI' DAviS & RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATrV LAW TEATISE
§ 7.9, at 352 (3d ed. 1994).
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bodies making choices among alternatives in response to social needs and
political inputs. The literature of the time is filled with concerns about
the "capture" of administrative agencies by those they were intended to
regulate." Regulatory beneficiaries, those on whose behalf the agencies
were intended to act, were much less likely to appear in adjudicatory pro-
ceedings-both as a reflection of the political difficulties of organizing a
diffuse group of citizens for that purpose, and as a result of participation
rules for adjudication that made the participation rights of regulatory
beneficiaries hard to establish. One finds in the cases of the time not only
an appreciation of the virtues of rulemaking from this perspective, since
in rulemaking anyone was free to participate, but also an increasing insis-
tence that room be made even in adjudication for participation by regula-
tory beneficiaries-to balance the pressure on the agencies, as it were.85
Responding to similar impulses, regulatory reform legislation of the time
tended to stress openness-the Federal Advisory Committee Act,88 Free-
dom of Information Act,37 and Government in the Sunshine Act 88 all
sought to pull information about government functioning into public
view, and to do so in ways that either paid no heed to the particular
claims of the persons who might seek this information, or explicitly
sought in the outcome political balance among possibly interested groups.
As rulemaking became more prominent, important, and popular,
courts began to encounter it more frequently. A series of interpretations
developed, captured in the phrases "paper hearing" and "hard look," that
significantly heightened both the procedural demands of rulemaking and
the intensity with which courts would review rulemaking outcomes.8 9 The
Freedom of Information Act4" permitted participants in rulemaking easy
access to documentary and other information agencies possessed. As a re-
sult both of this development and of judicial reasoning about what one
would have to know in order to make intelligent comments on a proposal
turning on disputable propositions of (generally scientific) fact, the APA's
requirement of notice of "either the terms or substance of the proposed
rule or a description of the subjects and issues involved" came to be un-
derstood to require agencies to share with the public, as part of their
34. See BERNARD SCHWARTZ, ADmINSTRATIVE LAW 23 (1976).
35. See, e.g., National Welfare Rights Org. v. Finch, 429 F.2d 725 (D.C. Cir. 1970);
Office of Communication of the United Church of Christ v. FCC, 359 F.2d 994 (D.C. Cir.
1966).
36. Pub. L. No. 92-463, 86 Stat. 220 (1972) (codified at 5 U.S.C. app. §§ 1-15 (1994)).
37. Pub. L. No. 89-487, 80 Stat. 250 (1966) (codified at 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1994)).
38. Pub. L. No. 94-409, 90 Stat. 1241 (1976) (codified at 5 U.S.C. § 552b (1994)).
39. See Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 941 (1976);
Greater Boston Television Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841 (D.C. Cir. 1970); see also Merrick B.
Garland, Deregulation and Judicial Review, 98 HARv. L. REV. 505, 525-61 (1985); Richard B.
Stewart, The Development of Administrative and Quasi-Constitutional Law in Judicial
Review of Environmental Decisionmaking: Lessons from the Clean Air Act, 62 IoWA L. REV.
713, 738-40 (1976); Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law,
88 HARv. L. REV. 1667 (1975).
40. Pub. L. No. 89-487, 80 Stat. 250 (1966) (codified at 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1994)).
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rulemaking proposals, the significant data in their possession. 1 Even if
new data was developed in the course of a rulemaking, it might be neces-
sary to make that new data available, so that it too could be commented
on. Moreover, the dimensions of "a concise general statement of basis and
purpose" similarly expanded, to include requirements to meet all "signifi-
cant" comments filed in the rulemaking and to reveal in some detail the
agency's reasoning process. If comments had produced significant changes
from the proposal-a possibility one might think the major reason to pro-
vide for notice and comment in the first place-participants needed the
chance for a second round of commentary to react to this shift in direc-
tion. In court, on review, it began to be noticed that agencies' judgments
did not have the political legitimacy of legislative judgments. Conse-
quently, an agency would be well advised to write its statement of basis
and purpose in a manner clearly demonstrating the factual basis for and
reasonableness of its judgments, and that it had taken a "hard look" at
any matters that had proved controversial.42 And judicial review immedi-
ately upon adoption of a rule, in the abstract rather than after particular
enforcement proceedings had been brought, became common after the
Supreme Court, in a 1967 case, stressed the "presumption" that final
agency actions-which completed rulemakings undoubtedly were-were
subject to immediate APA review.43
To some extent, these and other developments were the product of
mistaken judicial analogies between the newly important rulemakings and
what were for judges the more familiar forms of adjudicative action.
When courts began reasoning about the need for "adversarial comment"
or for opportunities to challenge witnesses or data presented by other
participants (notably the agency), their thinking smacked of the court-
room rather than the legislative hearing room.4 4 These aspects were em-
phatically disowned by the Supreme Court in a 1978 judgment that
reiterated the properly institutional character of rulemaking and stressed
the inappropriateness of judicially requiring procedures that had not been
statutorily provided for.45 This judgment did not, however, result in a re-
turn to the understandings of 1946. The Court's warnings could not oblit-
erate the new appreciation of rulemaking as a political as much as expert
process, that could not claim the electoral legitimacy a legislature would
enjoy. In addition to the Freedom of Information Act and other like legis-
lation, one could easily see that whenever Congress had recently consid-
41. See, e.g., United States v. Nova Scotia Food Prods. Corp., 568 F.2d 240 (2d Cir.
1977); Portland Cement Ass'n v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 375 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Kennecott
Copper Corp. v. EPA, 462 F.2d 846 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
42. For a discussion of the development of the "hard look" standard, see supra note
39 and accompanying text.
43. Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 140 (1967).
44. See, e.g., Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9, 55 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
434 U.S. 829 (1977); Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Blum, 458 F. Supp. 650, 659
(D.D.C. 1978).
45. Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 435
U.S. 519, 525 (1978).
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ered rulemaking issues (always in the context of particular, prominent
rulemaking agencies such as the EPA), it had specified additional proce-
dures like those the courts had been developing.46 Consequently, the "pa-
per hearing" and "hard look" elements, and the relatively heightened
character of judicial review, remained in place.
In the same time frame, the new political importance of rulemaking
was also generating increased presidential and congressional interest in
controlling its outcomes. Rules requiring the investment of tens or even
hundreds of millions of dollars in environmental protection or safety
equipment could have a significant effect on the economy at a time when
inflation was a major concern; and in any event the private investments
thus required were large enough easily to attract the attention of politi-
cians and their friends. The National Environmental Policy Act of 1969
had for the first time required agency actors to think forward about the
probable consequences of their major actions in coordination with the
White House-in that case, environmental consequences-and to con-
sider modifying proposals to reduce their negative impacts.47 It was not
hard for the White House to see that it would also be useful for agencies
to think forward about the possible economic consequences of (and justi-
fications for) their major regulatory actions, again under the supervision
of a White House office that could serve a coordinating function. The
White House began experimenting with these requirements. At about the
same time, Congress-realizing the large public and private consequences
of some rulemakings-began including in statutes that authorized
rulemaking a requirement that any rules the agency adopted be submit-
ted to the Congress for possible legislative veto. Under these provisions,
the rules would be deprived of effect if they were disapproved by vote of
one or both houses of Congress. Ordinary political oversight activities also
began to escalate at this time; a striking pair of graphics shows how dur-
ing the period 1961-1977, the number of pages published in the Federal
Register (a reasonable index of rulemaking activity) and the size of con-
gressional committee staffs and the number of congressional days devoted
to oversight activities each grew exponentially, along parallel lines.48
46. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-95, 91 Stat. 685 (codified at 15
U.S.C. § 792 note and scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
47. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-190, 83 Stat. 852
(1970) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321, 4331-4335, 4341-4347 (1994)).
48. PnR L STRAUss ET AL., GELLHORN AND BYSE's ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: CASES AND
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A professional colleague, upon reading an earlier draft of this essay,
remarked that one could argue that the democratic character of rulemak-
ing thus revealed rivals that of the legislature." While lacking the vote
with which, in theory, she controls her legislative representative(s), the
citizen's right to comment connotes a different disciplinary device-if her
comment is germane, the agency must respond to it or risk frustration in
adopting its rule. No citizen can force attention to her views upon her
legislature in quite this way; even if she appears at a legislative inquiry,
the permitted chaos of the legislative action will not be measured against
the cogency of her testimony. Requirements of rulemaking "rationality"
thus serve to impose practical bounds on agency judgment that do not
exist for legislatures; Congress can with impunity amend a statute in self-
49. Letter from Professor Sidney Shapiro, Rounds Professor of Law, University of
Kansas Law School (June 28, 1996) (on file with author).
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contradictory ways, 0 but an agency trying to "have it both ways" will
likely fail the judicial test of rationality. From a perspective that puts a
high value on the place of reason in even political discourse among citi-
zens, this virtue might be thought to counterbalance the missing disci-
pline of the ballot box.
C. 1977-93
Jimmy Carter may have been the first presidential candidate after
the New Deal to have successfully run his campaign against Washington
and the "big government" it represented; each of his successors has fol-
lowed his lead. It is perhaps not too extreme to find one explanation in
the explosion and changed character of rulemaking during the preceding
period; political campaigns of the time were rife with advertisements
mocking the detail and stringency of workplace and environmental rules.
In any event, the Carter, Reagan, and Bush administrations were charac-
terized by increasingly stringent efforts to gain presidential control over
rulemaking in the agencies. Congressional and judicial developments were
more mixed in character, owing in part to political choices by the Ameri-
can electorate that generally placed control of White House and Congress
in the hands of different political parties. Still, one can say that the polit-
ical character of rulemaking and the legitimacy and importance of effec-
tive political controls over it continued to gain recognition. At the agency
level, and among scholars, the judicial innovations of the preceding period
were being noticed and seen to be exacting a price: "paper hearings" gen-
erated mammoth records and "concise general statement[s] of basis and
purpose" expanded into the hundreds of pages to meet the demands of
"hard look review." As a result, rulemaking became more and more ex-
pensive to complete; "ossification" was the description increasingly heard
of the consequences. In fact, we did not lower our demands for the kinds
of regulation agencies like OSHA and EPA generated; threats to health
and safety continued to engage a perhaps disproportionate share of the
public's concern. But the combined effects of changes in rulemaking and
its control slowed the effective pace and volume of rulemaking
considerably. 51
It is useful to start an account of this period with the presidential
innovations, both because they were the most striking and because they
50. See, e.g., JERRY L. MASHAw & DAVm L. HARFST, THE STRUGGLE FOR AUTO SAFmY
(1990).
51. A particularly dramatic example is given in The Struggle for Auto Safety. Id. Fol-
lowing the bureaucratic shocks of this development, the National Highway Transportation
Safety Agency essentially ceased to initiate new rulemakings. In its first two decades, OSHA
averaged about one completed rule per year for protecting workers from hazardous contami-
nants of the air; when it attempted to set moderate, more-or-less consenses-based standards
for 428 toxic substances in one rulemaking, whose explanation spans 652 pages in the Fed-
eral Register, 54 Fed. Reg. 2332 (1989), challenges by persons concerned with eleven of




served to focus attention on the procedural period before the APA proce-
dures take hold, the time leading up to publication of a notice of pro-
posed rulemaking. One effect of the developments of the preceding era,
including somewhat misconceived judicial censoriousness towards politi-
cal contacts and private conversations occurring between agency staff and
outsiders during rulemaking processes, had been to make the notice and
comment period more of a formality than a formative event. In settings
where an agency could expect controversy, those controversies were dealt
with before the notice and comment period, and that period consequently
often came to serve confirmatory more than informative purposes. Having
to give full notice of its data as well as its thinking, fearing restrictions on
its ability to change once a proposal had been made without having to
provide for a second round of comments, and believing informal conversa-
tions with affected interests during rulemaking might be disapproved, an
agency had every incentive to complete its inquiries, to make whatever
accommodations with competing interests it was going to make, and to
reach near-final conclusions, before rather than after it issued its notice
of proposed rulemaking. And it was during this preliminary period, while
the agency was deciding just which of many possible rules it should pur-
sue and how to frame its proposal, that the presidential measures had
their most forceful impact.
While President Carter first established by Executive Order a
broadly applicable requirement of analysis and consultation respecting
so-called major rules-those an agency could expect to have an annual
impact of $100 million or more on the economy-an analysis of President
Reagan's more developed orders will give a clearer picture of the new
structures introduced into the pre-notice period. Under one, actually the
second adopted in point of time, agencies were required to develop an
annual rulemaking agenda, justified on projected economic grounds, in
consultation with a bureaucratic element of the President's immediate
staff, known as the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs
(OIRA);52 OIRA is located within the Office of Management and Budget
(OMB), the White House office that serves as the President's principal
institutional arm for contact with the agencies. Thus, the President-and
the highest levels of politically responsible officials in the agency it-
self-would be certain to be involved at the initial stages of setting
agency priorities for action. The order was obscure about the President's
ability to preclude an agency undertaking any given rulemaking effort; in
some cases, at least, that agenda was set by legislative obligations the
President could not negate58 But the very fact of a consultative process
introduced regular opportunities for influence that previously had been,
at best, accidental. Moreover, as rulemakings were placed on an agency's
agenda, that commitment to consider action, taken months if not years in
52. Exec. Order No. 12,498, 3 C.F.R. 323 (1986), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 (1988)
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advance of publishing an APA notice of proposed rulemaking, was made
public through semi-annual publication of a new document, a Unified
Agenda of Federal Regulation." Each rule under development was given
a paragraph in this impressive document-about the size of the Manhat-
tan telephone book-including the name and telephone number of a
"contact person" at the agency from whom further information could be
obtained, and with whom expressions of interest could be lodged. The
consequence, of course, was that not only was the White House engaged
during the whole of the pre-notice period, but any private person who
took the trouble to consult a widely available public document could also
become involved at an early stage.
The more important and earlier of the two Reagan orders took effect
later in the process of developing a proposal for rulemaking.5 5 Before issu-
ing a notice of proposed rulemaking for a "major rule,"-itself a charac-
terization over which OIRA exercised substantial control-an agency was
obliged to complete and clear with 0IRA a draft regulatory impact as-
sessment. This assessment was an elaborate document that explored the
economic justifications for the rule to be proposed, identified possible al-
ternative approaches, and sought to specify that approach that would
maximize social utility and minimize the expense to be inflicted50 This
perhaps sounds like an appropriate inquiry-and indeed most American
scholars concede it to be so-but the questions to be resolved often in-
volved very substantial uncertainty and judgment. Moreover, putting the
questions as the executive orders did gave an unmistakably economic cast
to the consideration of policies the legislature may have considered in
other terms. Many social goods are not readily monetized-the value, for
example, of environmental amenities or freedom from discrimina-
tion-and others, such as the value of human life, are, to say the least,
open to the most profound debate. In fact, the executive orders were care-
ful always to state that this form of cost-benefit analysis was to be em-
ployed only to the extent consistent with law."' Yet the underlying
political reality, as one will quickly see, is that this analytic requirement
both heightened the general influence of economically oriented policy
planners over rulemaking and propelled the agencies into very detailed
and technical discussions of their projects with the White House, at their
most formative stage, with correspondingly manifold opportunities for in-
fluence and delay. A notice of proposed rulemaking could not be pub-
lished until 0IRA was satisfied that the agency's draft analysis was
satisfactory, and that analysis then became a part of the rulemaking "rec-
54. The Unified Agenda of Federal Regulation is a reprinting of selected provisions of
the Federal Register.
55. Exec. Order No. 12,291, 3 C.F.R. 127 (1982), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 (1988)
(revoked by Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. 638 (1994), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601
(1994)).
56. Id.
57. Id.; 3 C.F.R. 323 (1986).
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ord" informing the comment period.8  Once comments had been received,
agencies were obliged to make their draft analysis final-again through an
OIRA vetting process-and that final analysis, once approved, also be-
came a part of the agency record, against which any eventual rule might
be assessed.59
More for political than legal reasons, these regimes were limited to
"executive agencies," and not extended to the independent regulatory
commissions (although a number of them probably engaged in similar
analyses and cooperated with the presidential process in a variety of
ways). They were established as bureaucratic control regimes, that cre-
ated no legal rights in private persons who might be interested in a rule.
Of course, there was no barrier to private interests attempting to bring
political pressure to bear on the White House. Indeed, most of the suspi-
cions expressed about these regimes resulted from the belief that they
had resulted in "special interest" influence over rulemaking outcomes.
Private communications of this character, it will be evident, run counter
to the openness themes to be found in such statutes and the Freedom of
Information Act, and threaten one's capacity to regard the process as a
rationalistic one. Despite occasional evidence of presidential strong-arm-
ing of the agencies, Congress generally tolerated the OIRA institution,
even when the White House and Congress were controlled by opposing
political parties. However, it directed its continuing oversight and efforts
to control the process to securing openness about agency-OIRA contacts,
and to obtaining agreements with OIRA and the White House that signif-
icantly reduced political access to OIRA staff. Some elements of the
OIRA process-the periodic agenda of regulations under development
and requirements of pre-proposal analysis-found their way into legisla-
tive enactments of the period; through this legislation and other executive
orders, analytic requirements proliferated to a degree many found risible.
As a practical matter, however, only the OIRA economic impact analysis
requirements were seriously pursued during this period. The net effect of
these developments, again, was to heighten considerably the importance
of the time before a notice of proposed rulemaking was published, and to
make the President a significant participant in agency rule development
then.
Congress was somewhat more frustrated as a "player" in rulemaking
during the Carter, Reagan, and Bush presidencies. An important Su-
preme Court decision found that the legislative veto was constitutionally
invalid; 0 if Congress wished to disapprove of a rule an agency adopted, it
would have to do so by statute, subject to the possibility of presidential
veto. 1 During the Reagan and Bush administrations, when a Democrat
Congress was more likely than the Republican President to want govern-
ment to achieve positive regulatory ends, Congress frequently enacted
58. 3 C.F.R. 127 (1982); 3 C.F.R. 323 (1986).
59. 3 C.F.R. 127 (1982); 3 C.F.R. 323 (1986).
60. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 959 (1983).
61. Id.
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quite detailed legislation, specifying, for example, just which chemicals
EPA should regulate and setting very short and judicially enforceable
time frames within which it was obliged to act.6 2 Yet Congress can pro-
duce a 700-page set of amendments to the Clean Air Act only if it engages
in subordinate legislation in another form: detailed staff work is capable
of producing legislation of this character; a deliberative political process
engaging the whole of a representative legislature is not. Moreover, the
experience of Congress, too, was that the detailed specification was often
unavailing. Even if a timetable might serve to reduce the White House's
capacity to inflict delay on unwanted rules, agencies could not or would
not adopt all the rules required within the very brief times given, and the
courts were essentially incapable of providing effective relief. Several ef-
forts to "reform" the rulemaking process sought to put in statutory form
the "paper hearing" and "hard look" developments of the preceding era
that we have already discussed;63 these failed of enactment for political
reasons.
The one successful legislative development, enactment of a regime of
"negotiated rulemaking,"" served to confirm the importance of the pre-
notice period. Under this regime, one that many hoped would reduce the
growing contentiousness and expense of rulemaking, agencies were en-
couraged to form balanced private-public negotiating groups, representa-
tive of all interests likely to be involved, that could, with a facilitator's
aid, develop consensual proposals for rulemaking.0 5 This is an important
and hopeful development, yet one should notice where it fits in the time-
line of rule development. Regulatory negotiation occurs before public no-
tice of proposed rulemaking. The very idea is to develop a proposal that,
when made public, will attract no significant opposition. In this respect, it
mirrors the shift in emphasis from the post-notice to the pre-notice pe-
riod that the presidential regimes and incentives provided by judicial re-
view have helped to bring about.
Judicial review during these years was characterized by growing
awareness and acceptance of rulemaking's political cast and responsibil-
ity. "Hard look" review continued, and indeed was endorsed by the Su-
preme Court in 1983, over a partial dissent that stressed the properly
political elements of some rulemaking judgments.6 6 But in perhaps its
most influential case of this period, the Supreme Court enunciated princi-
ples of substantial deference to agency interpretation of ambiguous statu-
tory language, appearing to state in its peroration that it did so precisely
because the agencies' place in politics and responsibilities to the Presi-
62. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 2643 (1994) (specifying that the EPA act within 360 days of
Oct. 22, 1986 to regulate friable asbestos).
63. For a discussion of the "paper hearing" and "hard look" developments of the pre-
ceding era, see supra note 39 and accompanying text.
64. The Negotiated Rulemaking Act of 1990, 5 U.S.C. §§ 561-570 (1994).
65. Id.




dent made them the more appropriate determiner of what necessarily
would be policy issues.17 When they encountered the possibility that
White House consultations occurring under the executive orders might
have persuaded agencies to reach results different from those they would
have reached strictly on their own, the courts expressed concern only to
prevent the use of the process as a "conduit" for private special interests.
They saw the President's possible influence as an appropriate working
out of his responsibilities as chief executive, for which he could be held
responsible by the electorate. 6 The courts also accepted the possibility of
congressional pressures-at least outside of circumstances that unmistak-
ably demonstrated the injection of a statutorily irrelevant factor or fac-
tors into the decisionmaking process. 9
Rulemaking, 1977-93
Consult with OIRA, secr lc ,
on RegulatoryAgenda; pubishl IInitiation I
notice with agency contact Iconser appropriateness oI
.g.....b Statutory deadlinesfor action on rules
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The collective result of presidential, congressional, and judicial scru-
tiny, and of the clogging of the pre-notice period as well as complexifica-
67. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837, 842-45
(1984). While the Court stressed "policy" and the political connection, the position can also
be understood as a concession that, as to matters of expert assessment of social and techno-
logical needs, the agencies are also superior actors (and, in general, are appointed for this
purpose).
68. Sierra Club v. Costle, 657 F.2d 298, 405 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
69. Id. at 400-01.
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tion of APA procedures, has been further ossification of rulemaking. Yet
it is also possible that we are now beginning to see a substitution of polit-
ical for judicial controls, that in the longer run could again free up the
rulemaking processes. Judicial review has real weaknesses for controlling
the outcomes of rulemaking, not so far from its deficiencies in relation to
review of statutes. It is wholly retrospective and frequently does not reach
completion until years after a rule's adoption. Invoked by particular par-
ties with focused complaints, it is not well suited to conveying to the
court a balanced picture of the issues and proceedings, but rather tends
to give distorting influence to details taken out of context. To the extent
courts can be engaged by the issues of judgment and policy presented,
one risks substituting the judgment of persons particularly unsuited by
training and position for either expert or political understandings. In
light of these difficulties, courts may find it possible to retract some of
their attentiveness to rulemaking as political controls-controls which by
and large are prospective and operate before final agency deci-
sion-develop and are accepted as legitimate. To a degree, American
scholars believe, the intensification of judicial review during the '60s and
'70s came in reaction to the absence of other controls over what had be-
come very high-consequence decisionmaking. A number of recent state-
ments by the Supreme Court about the different domains of political and




The most recent period is identified for convenience with President
Clinton's election, but is as strikingly connected with the Republican con-
gressional "revolution" of November 1994. It has been characterized by
continued growth in political control mechanisms over rulemaking and
debate over the virtues of judicial review. Presidential and scholarly at-
tention to the rulemaking process has tended to focus yet earlier in the
process on the point at which priority choices are made and then prelimi-
nary steps are taken towards the development of rules. Particularly for
the agencies responsible for health, safety, and environmental regulation,
finding suitable procedures and principles for comparing the various risks
to which regulation might be addressed has emerged as an issue of central
importance. The difficulty of this task is a function of both the inevitable
70. The dominant arguments are for a lighter judicial touch in assessing agency inter-
pretations of factual and policy issues. See MASHAW & HARFST, supra note 50; McGarity,
supra note 10, at 1440; Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Seven Ways to Deossify Agency Rulemaking,
47 ADiaN. L. Rxv. 59, 65 (1995). One scholar has suggested a substitution of congressional
(political) for judicial review, by requiring formal adoption of all rules as statutes-which
would then have the benefit of the light judicial touch that characterizes constitutional re-
view of social statutes. Paul R. Verkuil, Rulemaking Ossification: A Modest Proposal, 47
ADMIN. L. Rv. 453 (1995). Congress, however, has proved unwilling to make such a firm
commitment of its political capital and, indeed, has, in effect, instructed the courts to stay
their present course. See infra text accompanying note 82.
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uncertainties of assessment and the public's widely varying attitudes to-
ward risk.7 1 Congress has been considering a wide range of "regulatory
reform" measures, only some of which deserve that description and most
of which clearly would tighten controls over rulemaking at all stages. In
this brief time, no notable new judicial trends can be discerned, although
the Supreme Court's emphasis on the political character of rulemaking,
with the consequence of narrowing the opportunities for judicial review,
appears to be continuing.
A number of other influences affecting rulemaking might also be
noted. The pressures for balancing the federal budget have resulted in
stringent limitations on agency resources, with obvious implications for
their capacity to make and enforce rules. Increasingly, too, agencies are
being pressed periodically to review their existing body of rules-as legis-
latures never do-with an eye to pruning out those rules that through
aging or change in social conditions have lost their continued utility.
This, too, diverts time and resources. These developments, however, have
not found reflection in changes in rulemaking process, and so will not be
spoken of further here.
President Clinton has continued the "regulatory analysis" regimes of
his predecessors, but with changes whose stated intention is to reduce
what had previously been experienced as its somewhat reactive charac-
ter.7 2 In the prior administrations, early stages of regulatory development
were in fact given relatively little attention; OIRA became deeply in-
volved only after a draft regulatory impact statement had been delivered
to it. By that time, directions had already been set, relations tended to be
somewhat adversarial, and OIRA was reduced to an essentially reactive
function to the particulars of rules in which major investments of effort
had already been made. The stated ambition of the Clinton order is to
put OIRA's emphasis on working with agency personnel in a more general
way at earlier stages, to assure that appropriate intellectual processes for
target selection and analysis are in place; much less attention is to be
given to the particular analyses that may result from these processes, if
the processes themselves are found to be appropriate and generally relia-
ble.73 While President Clinton's OIRA has not foregone post-event review,
it has emphasized the coordinative and oversight functions of presidential
review; the effect of the new Executive Order is to subordinate the poten-
tial of OIRA review for supplanting particular exercises of agency discre-
tion that many thought had too fully realized under earlier regimes.14 A
variety of measures for assessing risk (as a means of influencing agencies'
71. That is, we are much more tolerant of risks that are individual and that we think
we control-those of driving or cigarette smoking, for example-than we are of those that
are shared, possibly catastrophic, and beyond our individual control-flying, or residual pes-
ticides in food. Thus, it is trivial to show that the public insists on many more government
dollars being spent to prevent each aviation death than each death occurring on the
highways.
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initial choices of rulemaking targets) are in developmental stages, and are
reflected in proposed legislation that has not yet been enacted.75
Focusing just on legislation that has been enacted, one can say that
Congress has embraced the analytic requirement-to the point of making
it a matter of legal right for at least some private participants in rulemak-
ing-while also providing a mechanism for itself to oversee both the
agency's general implementation of these requirements and any rules that
may result. The Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 199570 and amend-
ments to the Regulatory Flexibility Act 77 enacted in 1996 achieve the first
of these ends. While principally concerned with the impact of federal reg-
ulation on state and local governments,78 the Unfunded Mandates Re-
form Act also requires something very like economic impact analysis for
any major rule affecting the private sector, and imposes on the rulemak-
ing agency the obligation to select the "least costly, most cost-effective or
least burdensome alternative that achieves the objectives of the rule," ab-
sent some very good explanation why this cannot be done as a matter of
law or important policy.79 OIRA, rather than the courts, was enlisted to
secure compliance with this Act. 0 A year later, however, when Congress
amended the Regulatory Flexibility Act (which requires the making of
special analyses to identify and avoid any disproportionate impact of reg-
ulation on small business), it made that Act judicially enforceable on be-
half of its small business beneficiaries. 81 The availability to small
businesses, at least, of after-the-fact judicial enforcement of analytic re-
quirements seems likely to increase agency caution in rulemaking
significantly.
The most striking measure, however, is subtitle E of Title II of the
recently enacted Contract with America Advancement Act,82 which puts
in place a regime for formal congressional review of all agency rulemak-
ing. It has, of course, always been possible for Congress to react to the
adoption of any particular rule by enacting a statute that, if it secures
final passage with presidential approval or over a presidential veto,
reaches a different result. What this statute does is to create an automatic
process for generating legislative consideration of disapproval in every
case of agency rulemaking, that brings all rules before Congress for re-
view immediately upon their adoption. 83 For major rules, in particular,
agencies must supply both Congress and its professionalized oversight bu-
reaucracy, the GAO, with copies of all analyses made in the course of the
rulemaking-under the Executive Orders, the Unfunded Mandates Re-
75. Id.
76. Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995, 2 U.S.C.S. § 1501 (L. Ed. Supp. 1996).
77. Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act, Pub. L. No. 104-121, § 241,
110 Stat. 864 (1996).
78. 2 U.S.C.S. § 1513.
79. Id. § 1535.
80. Id.
81. Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act § 244, 110 Stat. at 867-68.
82. Id. § 251, 110 Stat. at 868.
83. Id. at 868-71.
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form Act and the Regulatory Flexibility Act, in particular. The GAO is
instructed quickly to report its conclusions on their adequacy to the rele-
vant congressional committees." Within a period of time that is brief in
relation to what either rulemaking at the agency level or judicial review of
rulemaking consume, the appropriate committees in either House may
generate a resolution of disapproval in a prescribed form. If that occurs,
and the resolution is adopted by both Houses of Congress and signed by
the President (or enacted despite his veto), the rule ceases to have legal
effect and the agency is deprived of authority to adopt a similar rule in
the future unless new legislation is enacted authorizing that. 5 If no reso-
lution is passed, the statute says, a court reviewing the rule is instructed
to ignore any congressional consideration such a resolution may have
received. 6
There is a good deal more to the Act than this, of course; and the
uncertainties that He in the details of its provisions for the timing of con-
gressional review, in particular, promise to add further discouragement
and expense to rulemaking at the agency level. In the framework of this
report, however, what seem especially notable are two elements: first, how
well and even appropriately, viewed in the large, this statute fits the pat-
tern of development towards finding regimes for creating political as well
as legal responsibility for the high-impact rules that have become so
much a part of the American legal landscape; second, how in its details
the Act will probably frustrate this development, inviting irresponsible
rather than responsible agency and legislative behavior. The first point is
probably evident. With passage of this statute, Congress as well as the
President is positioned to oversee significant rulemaking and the intellec-
tual integrity of the activity that produces it; the political accountability
of agency rulemaking could be heightened by the regular (and also insti-
tutional) oversight the use of GAO and the resolution-of-disapproval pro-
cess entail. In this way, as with the already established processes of
presidential oversight, the political legitimacy of adopted rules could be
considerably enhanced.
A number of elements of the statute undercut this rosy view, how-
ever. First, the statute is not limited to the major rules, however defined,
whose influence and impact have generated the developments we have
been following. Every action an agency takes that fits the APA's defini-
tion of "rule," not only legislative rules but also the much larger volume
of interpretive rules, statements of policy and other forms of guidance,
must be provided to Congress for consideration under the disapproval
procedure. 87 Even though major rules are in some respects singled out for
more intensive assessment, the much greater volume of referrals thus
called for threatens to distract Congress in two respects: first, by spread-
ing thin its resources for considering any particular effort; second, by
84. Id. at 869.
85. Id. at 871-72.
86. Id. at 871.
87. Id. at 868-69.
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threatening that (as in today's gargantuan statutory enactments) special
interests will find it easier to slip by a resolution of disapproval, than
would likely be the case if only the relatively few prominent and large-
consequence rulemakings offered such targets.
Second, the statute fails to pay the coin of political responsibility for
the process that has been undertaken. Probably most rules will not be
disapproved; the question of disapproval will be resolved within a few
months, surely faster than the years judicial review typically consumes,
and so the result will be known by the time the courts finally pronounce
on the legality of the agency effort. As we have seen, judicial review has
become significantly more intense over the past quarter century, largely
in reaction to the major consequences of major rules and the absence, at
the time this development occurred, of real political institutions for con-
trol of the process. Scholars of the time talked openly of the judicial re-
view process as a kind of substitute political process, in which
"representation" and other such issues were central elements.8 8 Many at-
tribute much of the ossification of rulemaking at the agency level to this
intensification of judicial review, leading agencies to practice "defensive
medicine" against the quite exquisite assessments of factual support and
judgment "hard look" review can often entail.8 9 One might have hoped
that, seeing that agencies must now defend their judgments to both
White House and Congress, and do so in a time frame much more inti-
mately connected with their action than judicial review can hope for,
courts would conclude that their efforts outside the strictly legal arena
could be somewhat relaxed. However, the statute explicitly instructs them
to pay no heed to Congress's consideration of a rule. In doing so, it both
frustrates this hope and permits Congress itself to be irresponsible for the
review process; the provision is a denial that Congress has undertaken
any political accountability for rules that are left in place. While one can
understand its preference to act in this selfish way, the result is to suggest
that this enactment is just another obstacle, further increasing the costs
and uncertainties of rulemaking, rather than a sound movement toward
enhanced political accountability for rulemaking.
Third, the consequence of a successful resolution of disapproval is, in
effect, an irresponsible act of legislation generating possibly unwarranted
uncertainty about an agency's legal authority. Recall that the statute is
explicit that if any rule is disapproved, the agency may not adopt a sub-
stantially similar measure unless it has been freshly authorized by statute
to do so.90 Even if disapproval necessarily entailed a judgment that the
agency's action was or ought to be outside its legal authority, it would be
objectionable to delegate to the courts, retrospectively on review of fol-
88. See, e.g., Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law,
88 HARv. L. REv. 1667, 1670 (1975).
89. E. Donald Elliott, Re-Inventing Rulemaking, 41 DuKE L.J. 1490 (1992); Pierce,
supra note 70; Sidney A. Shapiro, Political Oversight and the Deterioration of Regulatory
Policy, 46 AnuN. L. Rv. 1 (1994).
90. Stewart, supra note 88, at 871-72.
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low-on rules, the task of deciding just how an agency's enabling statute
had been amended. That is the effect of this curious provision, which sub-
tracts "some" authority that might be thought to have been previously
granted, but leaves it to later judicial decision to say just what that sub-
traction has been. And of course we know that disapprovals will not nec-
essarily entail such judgments. Members of Congress need neither to have
nor to express any particular reason for voting for them. "Hands off the
funeral industry just now!" can be the governing impulse. Moreover,
before the courts have any chance to pass on a subsequent rule that ar-
guably tries to do again what once failed, the proposal will again have to
be submitted to Congress for possible disapproval. But to see matters this
way is also to see that the resolution of disapproval, if it has this result,
is another diminution rather than enhancement of Congress's political ac-
countability. The public can understand and respond at the polls to a
statute that says "Hands off the funeral industry!" Resolutions of disap-
proval are much more opaque. And if impulses like these do explain reso-
lutions of disapproval, it is particularly unwarranted to give them the
consequence of (uncertainly) diminishing legal authority.
Rulemaking, 1993 -
~ . . Statutory deadlinesl
for action on rules
"Paper hearing" requement o
must still be met in statemnt of
basis and purpose
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These impacts, together with the uncertainties about rulemaking ef-
fectiveness introduced by the simple fact of this process and the varying
delays in effective date it may entail, will raise the costs of rulemaking
further. Particularly at a time when government's resources generally are
straitened, one can expect agencies to look for alternative means of ac-
complishing their business. They may be motivated to substitute a large
number of lower-consequence rules for "major" ones, if that can lower
their oversight exposures and costs; or to imitate congressional practice in
dealing with the President by bundling vulnerable rules with others Con-
gress would find politically difficult to disapprove; or to move from legis-
lative rulemaking, if they can, to the issuance of guidance and policies
that, although not binding, may nonetheless help to shape desired con-
duct; or, most dramatically, to achieve what they can through case-by-
case adjudication. With any of these consequences, note, the public will
have lost engagement, responsibility, and accessibility to law at the
agency level; and the agency's own processes for communicating its de-
mands to the world it regulates will have become markedly less efficient.
II.
When administrative adjudication developed, the model of the court-
room trial against which it developed was clear. Over the course of a cen-
tury or more, we have been working out what elements of that model are
essential to fairness, and which can be displaced in the interests of im-
proving efficiency and gaining (or at least not losing) accuracy.9 1 Notably,
we have produced not one, but several workable models of agency adjudi-
cation, depending on the particular context; and among them we can find
commonalities of concern with notice, opportunities to be heard, to know
and respond to opposing evidence, and to an impartial, reasoning decider
who acts on the basis of the developed record. The APA specifies proce-
dures rather close to the trial model for the most important of adjudica-
tions, but acknowledges the possibility of less formal proceedings; and
both particular statutes and due process case law over the years have sup-
plied a spectrum of procedurally less demanding alternatives.9 2
The history of rulemaking, which has captured our attention for a
much shorter span, has been one of adding rather than subtracting proce-
dures in relation to the starting point model, the legislative process. To
be sure, the governing constitutional holding concerning rulemaking,
voiced in typically epigrammatic style by Justice Holmes, is that politics
provides the citizens' only refuge; the interests of those affected by rules
91. Roger C. Cramton, A Comment on Trial-Type Hearings in Nuclear Power Plant
Siting, 58 VA. L. REV. 585, 592 (1972). A particularly elegant evocation of the tradeoffs inevi-
tably involved in procedural choices appears in JERRY L. MASHAW, BUREAUCRATIC JUSTICE:
MANAGING SOCIAL SECURITY DISABI.ITY CLAIMS 21-23 (1983).
92. With characteristic insight, my casebook colleague, Roy Schotland, points out that
changes in court trial practice since that time, in pre-trial procedures particularly and also
in the mix of alternative dispute resolution techniques, suggest we should be examining our
trial models as well.
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are to be "protected in the only way they can be in a complex society, by
their power, immediate or remote, over those who make the rule."9 3 But
the legitimacy of statutes is anchored by citizens' votes for those who en-
act them; remote controls over those who make rules has proved more
problematic-particularly as we have come to accept that politics as well
as expertise is often, in fact, a central element in rulemaking judgment. In
the half-century's developments we have been reviewing, it is not hard to
discern a working out of answers to that quite general and important
problem, alongside the arguable obstructionism of those who wish simply
to prevent rules, or the misguided analogy to trials of courts who do not
accept the difference of this enterprise.
It would be surprising, too, if those answers did not vary in relation
to the nature and importance of the rule at issue. When the Supreme
Court seemingly rebuffed the judicial procedural developments of the
1970s in its Vermont Yankee decision"-in the event, it proved to have
disapproved only the most trial-like of them-then-Professor Antonin
Scalia remarked that one could not expect a single procedural model to fit
all needs, that the project of an APA would make sense only if it con-
tained a range of procedural models among which Congress could choose
in creating particular programs.9 When the focus of rulemaking shifted
from specialized, industry-embedded economic regulators setting details
for their particular industries to general-competence agencies making na-
tionwide judgments about health, safety and the environment, the nature
of the questions asked and the stakes in their answers changed as well.
The distinctions between "major" and other rules that have emerged in
the decades following, and the heightened interest in problems of priori-
tization and risk assessment reflect these changes. So, too, the emergence
of settings in which rulemaking inevitably had a high science content dur-
ing the 1970s helped to identify public knowledge of an agency's
database-a subject entirely unaddressed in 1946-as an essential ele-
ment of rulemaking. For a rule that threatens to impose significant costs
on the private sector on the basis of estimates entailing the resolution of
scientific uncertainties projecting decades into the future, the importance
of requiring public exposure for underlying studies, models, and factual
assessments (mirroring scientific methodology) is quite independent of
misplaced concerns about "adversariness." This element is missing when
the issue is what choices of berry basket local fruit packers should have.
The original model of notice and comment rulemaking may remain
entirely adequate for the latter sorts of judgments. It is not simply that
such rules have lesser impact. A frequent characteristic of high-conse-
93. Bi-Metallic Inv. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 239 U.S. 441, 445 (1915) (empha-
sis added). The State Equalization Board, whose order raising all Denver assessment rates
by 40% was at issue in the case, was, it is not always noted, an elected body.
94. Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 435
U.S. 519, 525 (1978).
95. Antonin Scalia, Vermont Yankee: The APA, the D.C. Circuit, and the Supreme
Court, 1978 Sup. CT. RaV. 345, 408 (1979).
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quence health, safety, or environmental regulation is that it seems to turn
on factual issues that ought to be ascertainable, within the limits of scien-
tific uncertainty that ought to be expressible. The proposition underlying
a benzene exposure rule, for example, is that human exposure to benzene
at a given number of parts per million for a given number of hours or
weeks or years will produce a given number of cancers; the problem is
finding out what these facts are. This apparent grounding in (hard-to-
determine and controversial) propositions of general fact is not a charac-
teristic of questions about berry baskets. Moreover, rules about berry bas-
kets may be produced within a regulatory community that, on the whole,
accepts the enterprise as a legitimate, even needed one; if individual out-
comes may be in error, the community does not experience the process as
one requiring special political legitimization. Indeed, in practice the tradi-
tional model appears still to be effectively in use for small-consequence,
industry-specific rulemakings (such as may characterize the Department
of Agriculture's regulation of particular commodities).
Palpably, simple notice and comment rulemaking is not adequate for
rules like those that require the private sector to expend many millions of
dollars to avoid exposing workers or the public to relatively slight concen-
trations of particular chemicals thought to cause cancer over long periods
of exposure. Given both the uncertainties and the stakes, exposure of the
agency's data and reasoning to public view and response, alongside the
simple fact of its proposal, seems essential. The consequences for large
sectors of the economy, perhaps varying state to state or region to region,
invite political as well as legalistic controls.9 6 A contemporary legislature
redesigning American rulemaking should recognize the need for political
legitimacy as well as legality, the evident differences between settings in
which the citizen's power over those who make the rules is "immediate"
and those in which it is "remote."
Moreover, it seems right that, for the most portentous rules, the issue
of prioritizing must be faced. Society has limited resources for action, a
limited capacity to sustain the costs of regulation. Any particular chemi-
cal that is regulated is just one among thousands that could have been
chosen for response; which ones should be chosen? How do we value the
effort to avoid cancer deaths through chemical exposures, at a given cost
per life saved, against that to avoid cancer deaths from radiation expo-
sures (nuclear power), or more immediate deaths through airplane or au-
tomotive accidents? Setting priorities in rulemaking, the earliest stage, is
not simple. Even if we could eliminate uncertainties about such questions
96. This aspect is particularly well-developed in relation to control of sulfur compound
emissions from coal-fired electric generating plants. What tradeoffs are made between the
type of coal burned (high-sulfur, low-sulfur), the controls exercised over emissions (wet or
dry scrubbing), requirements that old plants adjust or not to new controls, and issues of new
plant location have profound effects on the mining economies of different states, whose coal
has a sulfur content fixed by nature and whose generating facilities are already in place. See,
e.g., BRucE A. ACKFKRuN & WiLum T. HASSLER, CLEAN CoAL/DIRTY Aim OR How THE
CLEAN Am ACT BECAME A MULTBm=ON-DoLLAR BAiL-OUT FOR HIGH-SULFUR COAL PRODUC-
ERS AND WHAT SHOULD BE DONE ABouT IT 32 (1981).
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as how much "investment" would be required to save each human life for
the various rules that might be pursued, choosing the best target(s)
among them would be complicated by our distinctly non-linear attitudes
toward the reduction of risk-by the fact that we accept levels of risk
from activities that are voluntary, individual, open, immediate, mechani-
cal, accidental, and the source of personal pleasure, that we do not toler-
ate in contexts that are involuntary, shared or potentially catastrophic,
covert, delayed, health-related, and lacking in personal gratification. We
regularly spend more to prevent distant, statistical cancers than immedi-
ate accidental deaths; more on relatively safe school buses than our per-
sonal automobiles; and so forth-choices that must be regarded as
political rather than irrational.
Whatever procedures we choose for selecting rulemaking targets or
acting on those targets we select, our choice must also recognize the need
for the advantages of rules and rulemaking over their alternatives. Our
choices will inevitably create incentives for the agencies themselves, and
the possibility that agencies will react to some approaches by overspend-
ing on procedures, or by choosing alternative approaches that entail fewer
procedural risks or costs to them but also disadvantage the public, re-
quires forethought as careful as we now devote to the substance of the
rules themselves. Procedural impact analysis is as necessary for a govern-
ment of constrained resources as regulatory impact analysis is for the
economy as a whole. Our challenge is to find means of encouraging atten-
tion and responsibility without imposing debilitating costs, either directly
or by putting into the hands of those who would simply prefer to deprive
government action the means of inflicting them.
The burden of the current literature, briefly reviewed above, is that
current rulemaking procedures taken as a whole fail this test. That analy-
sis appears to be sustained in the dramatically slowed pace of rulemaking
and in the straitened realities of American government. Current proce-
dural requirements produce a procedural matrix so clogged and expensive
that agencies are driven to evade, to seek out alternatives. As has already
been suggested, Congress's recent actions and some of the current propos-
als threaten to complicate this picture further. Finding the "sweet spots"
in the competition among the demands of fairness, accuracy, and effi-
ciency-for the case of rulemaking, one might add "democracy"-in es-
tablishing rulemaking procedures would be a significant challenge
however earnestly one was seeking to learn the lessons of the past half
century. There are few signs, however, that this challenge has yet been
the "reformer's" guiding star.
Some contemporary American analyses effectively deny the possibil-
ity of a broadly public-spirited approach. "Public choice," a currently in-
fluential, economics-based approach to understanding political behaviors,
explains legislators' behavior in terms of their wish to stay in power-to
be re-elected, little more. Public choice theorists find little surprising, in
these terms, either in legislators' evasion of political responsibility for the
outcomes of government action or their willingness to deal with issues of
public policy strategically; here, the legislator will make an apparent com-
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mitment to a given policy, while there she will provide others the means
with which to obstruct its realization, hoping in this way to secure the
votes (support) of both groups. To these analysts, it was only to be ex-
pected (and, by implication, is not even an appropriate occasion for criti-
cism) that Congress's recently enacted procedures for reviewing
rulemaking will result in hidden, uncertain amendments to the statute if
they are successful, and denial of any responsibility for having reviewed
the rule, if they are not. Professor Scalia drew on these analyses when he
noted that procedures are not invariably sought as ends in themselves.
Rather, interest group lobbyists seek procedures strategically-not for
their procedural values as such, but because procedural rigor is all that
their clients (who would prefer to oppose proposed legislation outright)
can reasonably hope to achieve.9 Public choice theory teaches the bleak
lesson that nothing more is to be expected, that this is simply the natural
working out of a situation in which securing re-election is the central mo-
tivator for legislators, and special interests can claim a disproportionate
share of legislators' attention.
In my judgment, these are counsels of despair, premised on assump-
tions about human conduct that cannot be verified, and that lead inevita-
bly to the bleakest views of human society. The description even of
inevitable tendencies in human behavior need not invite normative ac-
ceptance of them. And the descriptive power of public choice analyses is
limited; it cannot explain altruistic behaviors we encounter daily. Of
course, the tendencies must be taken to be present; appreciation of them
animated the Federalists and underlies the theoretical arguments against
delegation.98 But, in this complex world, we will not escape delegation;
the trick, as the Federalists themselves knew, is to structure it to promote
its responsible exercise. And surely one of these secondary defenses is
public disapproval. In their excesses and irresponsible elements, if not in
their general direction, these outcomes reflect failures of a politically re-
sponsible legislative process. We can make the normative claims upon a
legislature that it assume political responsibility for its acts, and that it
fashion its procedural judgments from judgments about their quality as
procedures (and not adventitious substantive program benefits they may
confer upon special interests), even if we know that legislators will often
be tempted, and sometimes act, otherwise.
The pursuit of such claims would produce a procedural set more like
the current realities than the simple, single model of 1946. One cannot
credibly argue against an agency's obligation to expose the facts it thinks
it knows (including their associated uncertainties); and some analytic
structure for the pre-notice period in important rulemaking, that includes
formal opportunities for political inputs from the White House if not the
Congress, seems equally called for. Yet recognizing the developments in
public and political responsibilities these developments entail, we need to
97. Scalia, supra note 95, at 404-08.
98. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
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think carefully about the extent to which judicial review may now have
become redundant or may enable types of strategic behavior whose costs
(including the costs of agency defensive actions or of incentives to avoid
rulemaking) may exceed any expected benefits. Just as we now argue for
reliance on market-based incentives in lieu of command-and-control regu-
lation in many (but not all) industrial circumstances, we need to consider
in what circumstances pro-active political guidance that can be provided
by the President, and/or forms of congressional oversight, will supply ad-
equate assurance that procedural values will be respected, and sound de-
cision pursued. It is appropriate to limit the role of judicial review in
contexts where the President or Congress has taken political responsibil-
ity for agency outcomes, in part to avoid placing in private hands proce-
dural weapons readily adapted to adventitious use.
Our judiciary already recognizes the fact of political control as an
alternative to judicial control in a number of settings; Congress and the
President, too, have each shown that they prefer to make this tradeoff in
particular circumstances. The challenge we face, unsurprisingly like the
rethinking of regulation generally, is to make such inquiries a routine part
of our consideration. Doubtless the conclusions we reach will differ be-
tween environmental, health, and safety rules (where both the economic
stakes and the science/technology content of required judgment are high),
and those of a more routine, berry-basket character. The important point,
in my judgment, is that the inquiry be made. Politicians' efforts to substi-
tute procedural specification for limitations on authority over substance
will not disappear, because the former is politically easier to achieve, and
can be disguised in the rhetoric of fairness. What we must find are means
to brand those efforts as the service of special interests, a departure from
normatively desirable legislative practice. We shall not otherwise continue
to be able to govern.
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